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The present research focused on appraisal theories and emotional responses to art.  
Using a within-subjects design, Study 1 explored the role of value incongruence, 
perceived intention, and unpleasantness in the appraisal structures of anger and disgust.  
In addition, rejection was assessed as a possible action tendency of these emotions.  
Multilevel modeling analyses revealed that these appraisals were indeed related to the 
specified emotions.  Furthermore, it was found that anger and disgust predicted people’s 
rejection of statements endorsing the controversial artwork.  This suggests that rejection 
is a possible action tendency related to anger and disgust.  Study 2 used a behavioral 
measure to strengthen the relationship between emotions and behavior suggested by 
Study 1.  Results of Study 2 indicated that anger and disgust significantly predicted 
people’s acceptance or rejection of a postcard depicting Piss Christ, a controversial 
photograph.  These results suggest that rejection is a legitimate action associated with 
negative emotions.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
It would be no easy feat to catalogue all the emotions that a person experiences in 
an average day.  On any given day, a person can probably easily think of several 
emotions he or she felt from the time they woke up until they went to sleep at night.  
While that person may have felt generally happy all day, he or she probably encountered 
several things that evoked different emotional responses, however fleeting they might 
have been.  For example, a graduate student might feel anxiety over writing his or her 
thesis; parents might get angry when their child acts out.  Everyone experiences emotions 
to some degree, no question about it.  What is questionable, though, is what brings about 
these emotions and why a person experiences one emotion over another.  Understanding 
people's emotional responses could provide valuable insight to the study of human 
behavior, particularly how emotions evoke behavior, and one current avenue for studying 
emotions is through the use of aesthetics.    
People often perceive art in a positive light, giving way to emotions such as 
happiness and peacefulness.  In contrast, art can also induce negative states, such as when 
the emotions of anger and disgust are experienced.  It is likely that responses akin to 
anger and disgust were the driving force behind the political “Culture War” against the 
National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) that pervaded the early 1990s (Garrett, 1995).  
This Culture War, dubbed so by right-wing activist Pat Buchanan (1992), began in 
1 
response to artwork by various artists that depicted themes such as homoerotic nudes and 
religious figures submerged in urine (Political Research Associates, n.d.; The Tech, 1990; 
Van Camp, 1997).  What started as protesting and vandalism ended in lawsuits (Institute 
for First Amendment Studies, Inc., 1998), congressional hearings (Van Camp, 1997), and 
ultimately a cut in funding for the NEA (Garret, 1995; Political, n.d.).   
While it is reasonable to assume that some people might take offense to such art, 
it is more difficult to comprehend what exactly it was that motivated the public and 
legislators to infringe upon the First Amendment rights of these artists and others whose 
work was repressed during the Culture War (see Political, n.d. for further discussion).  
The “letter to the NEA expressing outrage” over the “morally reprehensible trash” 
(Political, n.d., p. 1) is an indication that emotions, particularly anger and disgust, could 
be the catalysts behind the aforementioned behaviors.   
To understand what role emotions such as anger and disgust could play in human 
behavior, it is necessary to consider what is known about emotions and cognition.  A 
review of the literature on aesthetic emotions provides a framework from which to further 
explore anger and disgust. The components of these emotions will then suggest a means 
by which to investigate how these emotions relate to behavior.    
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CHAPTER II 
THEORIES OF AESTHETIC EMOTIONS 
 
 
Berlyne’s Collative-Arousal Theory 
 Berlyne’s collative-arousal theory posits that two arousal systems dictate aesthetic 
emotions (Berlyne, 1974): a positive reward system and a negative aversion system.  
These systems are stimulated through collative variables, primarily complexity, novelty, 
uncertainty, and conflict.  These variables are considered collative in that they involve 
comparing information from multiple sources to determine the level of arousal they will 
initiate.  For example, a novel stimulus would be contrasted with similar stimuli in one’s 
informational repertoire to determine an appropriate response, or the appropriate level of 
arousal.  Collative variables are also considered to objective features of a stimulus object.  
Thus, artistic works, according to Berlyne, should elicit a stable, predictable response of 
arousal (Silvia, 2005a, 2005b). 
 Collative variables are thought to affect arousal when they are at the extremes; 
low or high levels of complexity, novelty, uncertainty, and conflict are what activate the 
arousal system.  The arousal system is considered to follow an inverted-U function.  As 
arousal increases, the reward system is activated, reflecting positive affect.  However, 
after arousal reaches and surpasses an optimal level, the aversion system is stimulated, 
reflecting negative affect (Silvia, 2005b; Silvia & Brown, in press).  What this indicates 
for aesthetics is that if an artwork is perceived as too complex, novel, uncertain, or 
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conflicting, it will elicit negative emotions.  Furthermore, if an artwork is considered to 
be too simplistic, familiar, certain, or consistent, the arousal system is unlikely to be 
stimulated, resulting in indifference.   
 While Berlyne’s theory once was the mainstream theory of aesthetics, it has since 
been discounted in the advent of the cognitive revolution in psychology.  Arousal is no 
longer considered to be a sufficient basis for emotion (Silvia, 2005b).  In addition, the 
definitions by which Berlyne describe the arousal systems indicate a point of weakness in 
his theory: emotions are considered to be either positive or negative, with no variation 
(Silvia & Brown, in press).  This means there is no manner by which to distinguish 
happiness from relief, or anger from disgust, for example.  Because Berlyne’s theory 
assumes that stimuli are constituted of stable, objective features, it is also unable to 
account for individual differences in emotions to the same stimuli, or different individual 
emotions to the same stimuli across time (Silvia, 2005a).  In consideration of these 
limitations, Berlyne’s collative-arousal theory has been discredited and virtually 
abandoned.  Theories that incorporate cognitive components have thus taken the stage in 
explaining aesthetic emotions. 
Martindale’s Prototypicality Theory  
 Prototypicality influences preference for a variety of stimuli.  The most 
commonly known example of this is the effect that averaging facial features had on 
people’s perception of attractiveness (Halberstadt, 2006).  The more the stimulus face 
was averaged, the more attractive it was rated.  Winkielman, Halberstadt, Fazendeiro, and 
Catty (2006) were able to show that prototypicality increased preference for random dot 
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patterns and common geometric patterns.  Halberstadt (2006) also reported that 
prototypicality effects were found for animals as well as artifacts.  This tendency for 
people to prefer prototypical stimuli has primarily been attributed to subjective 
familiarity of objects. 
 Martindale proposed that preferences for art also are influenced by 
prototypicality.  Evidence in favor of this theory was found in preferences of not only the 
object of the artistic work, but of the style of the work as well (Farkas, 2002; Martindale, 
Moore, & West, 1988).  Furthermore, ease of processing has been found to mediate this 
relationship between typicality and preferences (Winkielman et al., 2006).  Given these 
findings, the inverse is also supported: objects perceived as atypical and difficult to 
process are not preferred.  While there is significant support for prototypicality and 
preference theories, it is unlikely that these theories can explain emotion.  Preference (or 
not) is but one response; emotions, on the other hand, are numerous and multifaceted.  
Emotional response, then, cannot be formulated solely on the variables put forth by 
Martindale.  It is also unlikely that prototypically offensive art would be preferred over 
other works, no matter how “typical” they are (Silvia & Brown, in press).  In light of 
these limitations, Martindale’s theory should also be considered as an insufficient theory 
for explaining aesthetic emotions.  
Appraisal Theories as Componential Models of Emotion 
 Appraisal theories are becoming the primary theoretical guide in the study of 
emotional responses to aesthetics.  The basic premise of appraisal theories is that events 
or objects themselves do not cause emotions.  Rather, how the events or objects (in this 
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case, aesthetic works) are evaluated (or appraised) determine a person’s emotional 
response (Roseman & Smith, 2001).  This clearly cognitive approach to emotions seems 
obvious to many researchers today; however, in the context of the behavioral theories of 
arousal that dominated psychology for many years, this was a difficult concept to grasp.  
Magda Arnold is often attributed as offering the first insight to an appraisal approach to 
emotions, while still relying on a model of arousal (Arnold, 1960).  Arnold theorized that 
the first step to emotions was an appraisal of whether an object or event would help or 
harm the self.  The arousal initiated by this appraisal would thus dictate emotion and 
behavior.   Lazarus furthered this concept of appraisal with the contention that there were 
two types of appraisals: a primary appraisal of the consequences of a stimulus to the self, 
and a secondary appraisal of one’s coping ability of this consequence (Lazarus, 1991).  
The works of these theorists allude to the idea that dominates emotion psychology today: 
appraisal theories are componential models of emotions (Kuppens, Mechelen, Smits, & 
De Boeck, 2003).  A componential model indicates that an emotion is comprised of a 
unique set of components, and it is by these components that one is able to differentiate 
between emotions.   
 Appraisal theories reflect a componential model in that each emotion is 
considered to be comprised of a distinct appraisal structure.  This structure, in turn, 
reflects a specific set of evaluations that enables emotions to be differentiated from one 
another (Kuppens et al., 2003; Silvia, 2005b; Silvia & Brown, in press).  Common 
appraisal components involve evaluations of whether a stimulus is relevant and congruent 
to one’s goals, one’s ability to cope with the stimulus, attributions of causality and 
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responsibility for the stimulus, and evaluation of the how the stimulus compares with 
one’s morals (Silvia, 2005a). (The basis for these common components can clearly be 
seen in the early theories of Arnold and Lazarus.)  It is important to note that emotions 
that initially appear to be inconsistent or opposite with one another often have similar 
appraisal structures.  For instance, research indicates that the appraisal structure for 
happiness is comprised of goal relevance and goal congruence (Silvia, 2005a).  The 
appraisal structure for sadness also incorporates these appraisals, reflecting goal 
relevance, goal incongruence, low coping potential, and low expectancy for future change 
(Roseman & Smith, 2001).  It is the differences in components of an appraisal structure, 
then, that allow for distinction between emotions.   
 Components of emotions are not limited to those of the appraisal structures; 
action tendencies, or the behavioral consequences of emotions, are considered to be 
central to understanding emotions as well (Kuppens et al., 2003).  Nico Frijda proffered 
that it is not arousal that dictates emotion.  Instead, emotions (as the result of appraisals) 
generate arousal and motivate behavior (Frijda, 2007).  Therefore, not only should 
emotions be considered in terms of their precursors, but also in terms of their outcomes.  
It is important to note, however that an actual behavior does not have to be enacted to 
reflect an action tendency.  Rather, action readiness, or the desire to engage in a behavior, 
is also central to the concept of behavioral consequences of emotions.  Action readiness 
reflects a motivational state in which there is an urge to act.  This urge does not have to 
be fulfilled for it to be relevant to emotions.  Thus, action readiness captures potential 
behaviors, whether desirable or undesirable, that reflect the underlying emotion.   In its 
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strongest form, Frijda’s theory would indicate that appraisals cause emotions, which then 
cause behavior (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989).   
 Appraisal theories, while still often incorporating components of arousal theories, 
are not limited by the problems that plague Berlyne’s theory.  Because appraisal theories 
are based on the subjective appraisal of a stimulus, they are able to explain why different 
people exhibit different emotions to same stimuli.  Quite simply, it is because people 
appraise the stimulus differently.  In addition, the same person can appraise a stimulus 
differently across contexts, thereby accounting for why people experience different 
emotions to the same stimulus (Silvia, 2005b).  A logical extension of these assumptions 
is that in situations where the same appraisal pattern is exhibited, the same emotion will 
occur (Roseman & Smith, 2001).  These core assumptions of appraisal theories are also 
their core strengths.  They provide a means by which to understand how emotions occur, 
what emotions consist of, and why extensive variability in emotions is expressed between 
and within individuals.     
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CHAPTER III 
APPRAISAL STRUCTURES AND ACTION TENDENCIES 
OF ANGER AND DISGUST  
 
 
Anger 
 Anger is a common emotion that can be difficult to overcome and even harder to 
forget.  People can generally remember the last thing that made them really angry very 
easily, while it might take some thought for them to muster up the last time they were 
truly awed by something.  While anger is a normal, even functional human emotion, it 
can also be destructive and misplaced.  The complex nature of anger has been researched 
from many perspectives, such as in terms of its association with aggressive behavior, 
psychological disorders, and emotion states in general.  In studies involving retrospective 
analyses of events, Kuppens and colleagues (2003) found that anger was associated with 
frustration as a result of perceived goal blocking and other accountability, or the notion 
that someone else was responsible for the event.  Similarly, Silvia and Brown (in press) 
studied emotional responses to pictures in relation to appraisals of goal or value 
incongruence and of the intentions of the artist regarding these goals (in their study, 
Silvia and Brown used goal and value incongruence interchangeably - for the purpose of 
the present research, the focus is on value incongruence).  Results of this study indicated 
that the more incongruent with their values a picture was perceived to be, the more anger 
people reported experiencing.  Furthermore, anger increased when people felt that the 
artist was intentionally trying to offend others.  The combined results of these studies 
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indicate that value incongruence and intentionality are key components of the appraisal 
structure for anger.  These findings are also consistent with Frijda and his colleagues’ 
(1989) work on the appraisal profile of anger, which also used assessments of 
retrospective events. 
 Few studies have been conducted to ascertain what action tendencies could result 
from anger.  Frijda and colleagues (1989), in addition to mapping out appraisal profiles of 
numerous emotions, mapped out action readiness profiles of emotions.  With respect to 
anger, they found tendencies such as “in command – don’t want,” “moving against,” and 
“attending” to be relevant components of readiness.  In command – don’t want referred to 
the appraisal that they were in control of a situation or event they did not want to occur.  
Moving against reflected an antagonistic feeling of boiling inwardly, and also a reactant 
tendency in which one wanted to act out to curb the situation. Attending simply referred 
to the action of paying attention to the situation.  The pattern of action readiness and 
tendency observed for anger is thought to be unique, in that no other emotion is 
characterized by exactly the same tendencies.  What this indicates is that the more of 
these specific readiness factors that are observed, the more likely it is that a person is 
angry. This leads to the conclusion that one should be able to predict emotions based on 
action tendencies or appraisals; this is, in fact, what Frijda and colleagues found.   
In their study, Kuppens and colleagues (2003) did measure an action tendency 
relevant to the retrospective events reported by the people in the study.  Specifically, 
when recalling an event, people were asked about the extent to which they “wanted (did 
not want) to express” opposition (p. 262).  While this action tendency was found to be 
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related to anger, when subjects were asked if they “wanted (did not want) to do 
something about the situation” (p. 257), no relationship to anger was found.  This 
indicates that measures of action tendencies may need to be specific, referring more to a 
specific behavior, than a general ambiguous action.  This is an intuitive finding in that 
behaviors that are strongly linked with emotions (meaning that they would be 
characterized with more components of action readiness/tendency) would most likely be 
more direct and unambiguous.   
Disgust 
 Disgust is an emotion that, while extensively used by people across cultures, has 
been neglected in much of the literature on emotions.  The traditional definition of 
disgust is a response “to the actual or threatened incorporation of contaminated or 
unwanted stimuli” (Olatunji & Sawchuk, 2005, p. 935).  The domains of disgust are 
centered around core and animal-reminder disgust, and socio-moral disgust.  Core and 
animal-reminder disgust is a recoil response to contaminated food, bodily waste, and 
animals.  Socio-moral disgust encompasses an attempt to protect one’s “soul” and 
“personal territory and integrity” (p. 942).  It is this latter form of disgust that has been 
used in much of the research in aesthetic emotions (e.g., Silvia & Brown, in press). 
 In the same study where the appraisal structure of anger was explored by Silvia 
and Brown (in press), so too was the structure for disgust.  Their findings suggested that 
the core components in the appraisal structure of disgust were value incongruence and 
intrinsic unpleasantness.  Intrinsic unpleasantness reflected the extent to which an object 
is inherently aversive, rather than pleasant (Scherer, 2001).  Notice that disgust shares 
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with anger the structural component of value incongruence.  This indicates how similar 
appraisal structures can be found across emotions, but also how the differences in these 
structures allow for the differentiation of emotions.  Even when anger is controlled for in 
analyzing the appraisal structure of disgust, and vice-versa, value incongruence continues 
to contribute separately to these emotions.   
 Frijda and colleagues (1989) also studied the appraisal and action tendency 
profiles for disgust.  The findings of Silvia and Brown (in press) are consistent with the 
results of this early study, which found that “unpleasantness” and “other agency” were 
related appraisal components of disgust.  Pleasantness, naturally, was inversely related to 
disgust, whereas perceiving someone else as being the source of this unpleasantness 
(other agency) was positively related to disgust.  Disgust also shared one component of 
action readiness with anger, and that was the feeling that oneself was in command of an 
event they did not want to occur.  Anger and disgust diverged in that where anger was 
related to moving against, disgust was related to “moving away,” or avoidance.  This 
finding is consistent with the traditional definition of disgust, which implies that one 
would seek to avoid situations or objects they fear might contaminate them.   
Hostility 
 While the traditional definition of disgust once had an evolutionarily relevant 
connotation, more recent conceptions of disgust do not necessarily reflect a fear of 
contamination.  Rather, disgust is more often used as an expression of anger (Nabi, 
2002).  Theoretically, anger and disgust have been categorized along with contempt 
under what is known as the hostility triad (Izard & Ackerman, 2000).  While still 
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considered distinct emotions, the three consistently co-occur.  Thus, it is reasonable to 
expect that anger and disgust will share at least one appraisal component at any given 
time.  The relationship among these emotions is also reflected in the Contempt-Anger-
Disgust (CAD) triad hypothesis; the CAD triad hypothesis relates each of these emotions 
to a moral domain, the violation of which will then lead to the respective emotion (Rozin, 
Lowery, Imada & Hardt, 1999).  The placement of these three emotions under one 
umbrella term of hostility is consistent with what appraisal theorists have found 
concerning anger and disgust.   
The Present Research 
 The present research is intended to support and expand what is known about 
negative aesthetic emotions.  Researchers often ignore negative aesthetic emotions 
because they tend to pose problems for theories of aesthetic emotions (e.g., Martindale’s 
Prototypicality Model).  However, negative emotions, such as anger and disgust, are 
legitimate responses to aesthetic objects.  Study 1 will investigate appraisal components 
previously associated with anger and disgust, and it will expand the appraisal theories of 
emotions by attempting to establish an action tendency link for these negative aesthetic 
emotions.  Action tendencies in general have received little attention in the empirical 
literature, yet it could be that this component of the appraisal model significantly 
contributes to identifying emotions from one another.  Study 2 will elaborate on action 
tendencies through the use of a behavioral measure of rejection.  If it is possible to relate 
an actual behavior with an emotion, then the argument for the propensity for behavior 
(action readiness/tendency) can only be strengthened. 
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CHAPTER IV 
STUDY 1 
 
The previous research by Frijda and colleagues (1989), Kuppens and colleagues 
(2003), and Silvia and Brown (in press) suggests that value incongruence and 
intentionality are relevant components for the appraisal structure for anger, and that value 
incongruence and unpleasantness are key components for disgust.  Study 1 seeks to 
provide further support for these appraisal structures by providing additional measures of 
the structural variables. Therefore, it was hypothesized here that the cognitive appraisals 
of value incongruence and artist’s intentionality will significantly predict anger, and that 
value incongruence and unpleasantness will significantly predict disgust.   
Rejection was measured as a possible specific action tendency for these emotions. 
If people experience that they have some control over the situation, and that they can 
influence the situation by either approaching or avoiding the object of emotion, then they 
should exhibit the potential for behavior (action readiness).   Therefore, it was 
hypothesized that when reporting feelings of anger and disgust, people would also exhibit 
rejection of the picture. 
Participants  
A total of 80 undergraduate students (12 males, 67 females, 1 unreported) at the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro participated in this study.  Students received 
one credit towards a research option in their General Psychology course. 
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Materials 
Fourteen full-color photographs were selected for use in this study.  The pictures 
were selected based on their potential to elicit a variety of responses.  Particularly, 
mundane photographs were interspersed with controversial photographs by Andres 
Serrano and Robert Mapplethorpe.  Table 1 lists all photographs used; photographs are 
listed in the order they were presented.   
 
 
Table 1 
Study 1 Photographs by Order of Presentation 
 
Photograph    Artist    Year 
 
Aeronaut 2    Maria Friberg   2002 
Self-Portrait    Robert Mapplethorpe  Unknown 
Element 2    Mary Woodall   2002 
Jane Doe Killed By Police  Andres Serrano  1992 
Thomas    Robert Mapplethorpe  1987 
Aware But Still There 2  Maria Friberg   2002 
Ken Moody    Robert Mapplethorpe  1983 
Madonna and Child 2   Andres Serrano  1989 
Element 10    Mary Woodall   2002 
Fatal Meningitis   Andres Serrano  1992 
Parrot Tulips    Robert Mapplethorpe  1988 
Rat Poison Suicide   Andres Serrano  1992 
Hermes    Robert Mapplethorpe  1988 
Piss Christ    Andres Serrano  1987 
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Procedure and Design 
 Students participated in the study in groups of 3 to 8.   Students were seated at 
individual tables, where they reviewed and signed a consent form introducing them to the 
study.  The experimenter explained that the purpose of the study was to explore the 
various responses that could be elicited by different works of art.  Students were advised 
that some of the art could be found offensive or aversive, and that they were free to 
withdraw their participation at any time without any penalty. It was emphasized, 
however, that the purpose of the study was to understand any positive or negative 
reactions to art, and that no attempt was being made to personally offend anyone.  
Therefore, students were encouraged to participate fully in the experiment and be as 
sincere as possible with their responses.  In addition, students were assured that their 
confidentiality would be maintained.   
 After an opportunity for questions before beginning, students received a booklet 
containing the fourteen full-color photographs.  All photographs were labeled for order 
retention at the bottoms of the pages (Picture 1, Picture 2, and so forth).  The titles of the 
photographs were included at the top of the pages, as was a brief description of the 
photograph.  This was to ensure that participants were able to accurately interpret and 
understand the photographs.  Previous research indicates that understanding increases 
when this information is provided (see Silvia, 2005b for further discussion).  Students 
then received a questionnaire with one page corresponding to each picture (labeled 
Picture 1, Picture 2, … at the bottom).  Students were asked to view each picture and rate 
how much they agreed with each of the thirteen statements.   
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Statements were designed to reflect the two emotions, three structural 
components, and the action tendency of interest in this study.  Anger was measured with 
the statement, “This picture makes me angry.”  Disgust was measured with the statement, 
“I find this picture disgusting.”  Value incongruence was measured with two items (as 
opposed to the one item measure in Silvia & Brown, in press):  “This picture goes against 
my values” and “This picture violates society’s moral standards.”  Intentionality was also 
measured with two statements rather than one: “The artist is intentionally trying to offend 
people like me” and "The artist is deliberately trying to upset people."  
Unpleasantness/pleasantness was measured with one item: “This picture is pleasant.”  
Degree of rejection expressed in response to each picture was measured with three 
items: “Should this picture be shown at the Weatherspoon Art Museum?” (the 
Weatherspoon Art Museum is the University Art Museum), “Should the government 
provide grants to financially support this kind of art?” and  “Should this kind of art be 
displayed in public museums?” These statements were designed to reflect the 
endorsement or rejection of the artworks, which could reflect action readiness 
components for anger and disgust (see Appendix A for sample questionnaire).   
Obviously this study relies on self-report measures, and it is commonly known 
that self-report measures do not always reflect the best method of measuring behavior.  
The social-desirability bias can compromise the validity of self-report measures, as can 
the finding that people are often unaware of their own true beliefs and opinions. 
However, when studying action tendencies, it is important that action readiness (as a 
precursor to an actual behavior) be addressed.  Because action readiness reflects a 
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willingness (or unwillingness) to engage in a behavior, without the actual behavior 
having to be enacted, self-report measures can capture this willingness.  Self-report 
measures are one way to grasp the potential for action, without requiring that the action 
be carried out.   
All statements were measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “not at all” 
to 7 “yes, definitely.”  A personality scale and demographic measures were included at 
the end of the questionnaire for exploratory purposes.   Space was provided at the end of 
the questionnaire for students to share any additional comments about the study.  When 
participants had completed the questionnaire, they were given a written debriefing that 
included contact information for the experimenter (in case further questions or comments 
arose), and sources for further information on the topic of the study. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
 
 
Analytic Strategy 
 
 Data from this study were analyzed using multilevel modeling, or hierarchical 
linear modeling (HLM).  The study addressed individual responses to several different 
artworks, thereby providing multiple assessments per person.  The ratings for each 
photograph are not aggregated across people; instead, they are presumed to covary within 
the person.  Therefore, the ratings are nested within-person, meaning that traditional 
between-person analyses would be inappropriate (Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2002).  
Multilevel modeling can more accurately estimate the predictive value provided by each 
variable, as within-person analyses are not plagued with the threat of confounding 
individual differences (Nezlek, 2001).   
All analyses were conducted using HLM version 6.0 (Raudenbush et al., 2002).  
All levels assessed by multilevel modeling are done so at the same time.  Furthermore, 
coefficients for each variable at one level are analyzed at another level.  What this means 
is that the coefficients reported at level 1 are the dependent variables for the equations at 
level 2, and so forth (Nezlek, 2001).  For all models referenced by the hypotheses, 
random effects ANOVA models (also known as unconditional means models) were 
conducted in order to have a baseline model for comparison, and to calculate intraclass 
correlation (see Appendix C for further definition of this model).  These models were 
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then compared to random coefficients models (random slopes and random 
intercepts models) to determine the contribution of the predictor variables to the models 
(see Appendix D).  In an attempt to further understand the impact of the predictors on the 
outcome variables, intercepts and slopes as outcomes models (also known as full 
HLM/multilevel models) were conducted in which the aggregates of the predictors at 
level 1 are entered at level 2 as predictors of the level 1 intercept.  Appendix E describes 
this model in more detail. 
Anger 
Previous research has indicated that value incongruence and intentionality were 
associated with anger (Frijda et al., 1989; Silvia & Brown, in press), and it was 
hypothesized that the same results would be replicated in the context of aesthetic 
emotions.  Before these predictions were tested, the ANOVA model for anger was 
conducted.  From this model, it was found that the intraclass correlation for anger was 
0.1072, indicating that only 10.72% of the variability in anger ratings can be attributed to 
variability between people.  Thus, most of the variability in anger is at the within-person, 
between-photograph level.  Typically when intraclass correlations approach zero, it 
indicates that nesting in not necessary, and thus neither is multilevel modeling.  Instead, it 
would be appropriate to consider a person's responses for each photograph as if they were 
distinct responses, and then perform a regression analysis on the data.  In other words, 
photographs 1 through 14 for person j could be considered as if they had come from 14 
different people.  To determine if this is this case, it is necessary to look at the 
significance test for the variance component (τ00) associated with the intercept.  For this 
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model, the variance component was significant (τ 00=0.37, χ2(79)=211.73, p<0.001), thus 
indicating that the use of HLM is still appropriate for modeling anger.   
The ANOVA model also provides a reliability estimate of the intercept for anger 
(γ00 = 2.09, SE = 0.08, t(79) = 24.65, p<0.001)  that describes the extent to which one can 
be confident in the estimate of a given person's mean.  Essentially what this describes is 
what proportion of the estimate of a person's average is signal versus noise.  The 
reliability estimate for anger was 0.627, meaning that 62.7% of the variability in the 
intercept, or average anger, is due to true differences between people.   
The random coefficients model for anger was analyzed next; this model is the 
model that is used to test the predictions put forth above.  The predictor variables of value 
incongruence and intentionality were entered into the model as group-mean centered.  In 
this case, this means that the values for the predictor variables were centered on person j's 
mean.  Centering in this manner helps to separate the between- and within-group 
variation, and also aids in interpretation of the coefficients (Kreft, de Leeuw, & Aiken, 
1995).  Analyses supported the predictions in that value incongruence and intentionality 
were found to be significantly associated with reports of anger.  Specifically, people 
reported being angrier when they perceived a picture to be incongruent with their values 
(γ10 = 0.23, SE = 0.05, t(79) = 4.17, p<0.001) and as being intentionally offensive (γ20 = 
0.62, SE =0.06, t(79) = 9.75, p< 0.001).  The variance components for these variables 
were also significant (value incongruence: τ 11=0.13, χ2(76)=210.22, p<0.001; 
intentionality: τ 22=0.18, χ2(76)=211.73, p<0.001), indicating that these variables are best 
modeled as random (as opposed to fixed) effects.  The intercept (γ00 = 2.09, SE=0.08, 
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t(79)=24.66, p<0.001), or average anger when a person's rating of value incongruence 
and intentionality for photograph i equals their mean, was also best modeled as a random 
effect (τ 00=0.53, χ2(76)=778.70, p<0.001). 
Again it is possible to see how well the intercept and predictor variables are being 
modeled by looking at the reliabilities of the coefficients.  For the intercept, the reliability 
was 0.904, meaning that 90.4% of the variability in average anger is due to true 
differences between people.  The reliability estimate for the slope of value incongruence 
was 0.521, and so 52.1% of the variability of this slope is due to true differences between 
people.  Likewise, 49.7% of the variability for the slope of intentionality is due to true 
differences between people.  In addition, the proportion of the variance in anger that can 
be explained by the appraisals can be computed using the within-person variance 
components of the random coefficients model and the ANOVA model.  Results indicate 
that 74.25% of the variance in anger (at the photograph level) can be explained by the 
appraisals, thus further supporting the predictions.  For the variance-covariance matrix 
associated with the random coefficients model for anger,  see Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2 
Variance Covariance Matrix For Anger: Random Coefficients Model 
 
   Intercept  Value Incongruence  Intentionality 
 
Intercept  0.5258   0.0879    0.0335   
Value Incongruence 0.0879   0.1346    -0.1262  
Intentionality  0.0335   -0.1262   0.1819 
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The final model to be tested for anger was the intercepts and slopes as outcomes 
model.  Recall that this model involved placing the average value incongruence and 
intentionality ratings for person j as predictor variables for the slope at level 2.  By doing 
so, it is possible to determine if there are certain person characteristics reflecting value 
incongruence and intentionality that influence anger.  The predictor variables at level 1 
were again group-mean centered.  The results of this model replicated the results of the 
random coefficients model in terms of the effects of the appraisals on anger at level 1.  
Again, people reported being angrier when they perceived a picture to be more 
incongruent with their values (γ10 = 0.22, SE = 0.05, t(79) = 4.17, p<0.001) and as being 
intentionally offensive (γ20 = 0.68, SE =0.06, t(79) = 10.61, p< 0.001).  The variance 
components associated with these coefficients were also significant (value incongruence: 
τ 11=0.12, χ2(76)=212.66, p<0.001; intentionality: τ 22=0.16, χ2(76)=229.92, p<0.001), as 
was the variance component associated with the intercept (γ00=0.30, SE=0.12, t(77), 
p<0.02) (τ 00=0.17, χ2(74)=310.35, p<0.001).  Therefore, all coefficients are best modeled 
as random effects. 
The aggregate of value incongruence included at level 2 was nonsignificant 
(γ01=0.20, SE=0.13, t(77)=1.58, p=0.119).  What this indicates is that average value 
incongruence does not add to the prediction of anger.  Average intentionality was also 
added to level 2 and was found to be significant (γ02=0.64, SE=0.12, t(77)=5.31, 
p<0.001).  What this indicates is that people who were more inclined to think that 
something was done intentionally to begin with are more likely to report higher levels of 
anger.    
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The reliabilities associated with this model were smaller than those of the random 
coefficients model.  For the intercept, the reliability dropped to 0.756, meaning that now 
only 75.6% of the variability in anger can be said to be due to true differences between 
people.  While the reliabilities for the slopes of value incongruence and intentionality did 
not drop as significantly as the reliability for the intercept, they still declined.  For value 
incongruence, the reliability was 0.492, thus 49.2% of the variability in the slope for 
value incongruence can be attributed to true differences between people; 46.9% of the 
variability in the slope for intentionality can be attributed to true differences between 
people. For the variance-covariance matrix associated with this model, see Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3 
Variance-Covariance Matrix For Anger: Intercepts and Slopes as Outcomes Model 
 
   Intercept  Value Incongruence  Intentionality 
 
Intercept  0.1720   0.0738    0.0178  
Value Incongruence 0.0738   0.1157    -0.1066  
Intentionality  0.0178   -0.1066   0.1572 
 
 
Disgust 
 Because value incongruence and unpleasantness have previously been shown to 
predict disgust, it was predicted that these appraisals would predict disgust in this study 
as well.  Again, the first step of the analyses was to estimate the ANOVA model for 
disgust.  The intraclass correlation for this model was 0.0462, meaning that only 4.62% 
of the variability can be attributed to variability between people.  While this implies that 
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the nesting of the data is unnecessary, the variance component was significant (τ 00=0.21, 
χ2 (79)=132.56, p<0.001), indicating that HLM is still an appropriate analysis.  The 
reliability of the intercept (γ00 = 2.49, SE = 0.08, t(79) =31.08, p<0.001) was considerably 
lower than that for anger: 0.404.  Thus, it can only be confidently concluded that 40.4% 
of the variability in average disgust is due to true differences between people.    
The random coefficients model for disgust revealed that results again supported 
the hypotheses in that appraisals of value incongruence and unpleasantness were 
significantly related to disgust (again the appraisals were entered as group-mean 
centered).  People reported more disgust when they perceived a picture to be incongruent 
with their values (γ10 = 0.74, SE = 0.04, t(79) = 20.58, p<0.001), and unpleasant (γ20 = -
0.27, SE = 0.02, t(79) = - 9.91, p<0.001).  The variance component associated with value 
incongruence was found to be significant (τ 11=0.04, χ2(79)=157.08, p<0.001) and so 
value incongruence is best modeled as a random effect.  In contrast, the variance 
component for unpleasantness was not significant (τ 22=0.02, χ2(79)=87.97, p=0.229).  
For this reason, the random coefficients model was again estimated but with this variable 
included as a fixed effect.  A deviance test between the two models was then performed.  
Results indicated that even though variance component associated with unpleasantness 
was nonsignificant, it was still beneficial to leave it as a random effect (χ2(3)=15.33, 
p<0.01).  In addition, the variance associated with the intercept (γ00 = 2.49, SE = 0.08, 
t(79) = 30.81, p<0.001), or average disgust when a person's  value incongruence and 
unpleasantness ratings for photograph i equaled their mean, was also significant (τ 
00=0.42, χ2(79)=435.06, p<0.001) 
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The within-person variance of the ANOVA and random coefficients models was 
again used to determine the contribution of the appraisals in modeling disgust.  Of the 
variance in disgust at the photograph level, 69.5% can be explained by the appraisals of 
value incongruence and unpleasantness.  It can also be stated from the reliabilities for the 
random coefficients model that 90.4% of the variability in average disgust, 52.1% of the 
variability in value incongruence, and 49.7% of the variability in intentionality is due to 
true differences between people.  For the variance-covariance matrix for the random 
coefficients model, see Table 4.  
 
 
Table 4 
Variance-Covariance Matrix For Disgust: Random Coefficients Model 
 
   Intercept  Pleasantness  Value Incongruence 
 
Intercept  0.4270   -0.0506  0.0594  
Pleasantness  -0.0506  0.0156   0.0116   
Value Incongruence 0.0594   0.0116   0.0442 
    
 
 
When the intercepts and slopes as outcomes model was estimated for disgust, the 
predictor variables at level 1 were again group-mean centered.  Results further supported 
the hypothesis concerning the appraisals (at level 1) and disgust.  More specifically, 
people reported higher levels of disgust as ratings of value incongruence (γ10 = 0.78, SE 
=0.04, t(79) = 20.19, p<0.001) and unpleasantness (γ20 = -0.26, SE =0.03, t(79) = -10.04, 
p<0.001) increased.  Also in accordance with the random coefficients model, the variance 
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component associated with value incongruence was significant (τ 11=0.23, χ2(79)=160.52, 
p<0.001) whereas the variance with unpleasantness was not (τ 22=0.14, χ2(79)=91.22, 
p=0.164).  Again the model was conducted with this component fixed and a deviance test 
was performed to compare the two models; the test revealed that despite the 
nonsignificance of the variance component, the model still benefited from the inclusion 
of unpleasantness as a random effect (χ2(3)=15.50, p<0.01).  The variance component 
associated with average disgust (γ00 = 1.51, SE =0 .24, t(77) = 6.33, p<0.001) was also 
significant (τ00=0.13, χ2(77)=175.16, p<0.001), leading to the conclusion that all 
coefficients are best modeled as random effects. 
When the aggregates of value incongruence and unpleasantness were added as 
level 2 predictors of the intercept, both were significant (value incongruence: (γ01 = 0.68, 
SE = 0.05, t(77) = 12.82, p<0.001; unpleasantness:γ02 = -0.19, SE =0 .05, t(77) = -3.86, 
p<0.001).  What this indicates is that not only will those who perceive the photographs as 
being incongruent with their values and unpleasant report higher levels of disgust, but 
those who generally perceive things to be incongruent with their values and unpleasant 
will be more likely to report higher levels of disgust.  Thus, while these effects are 
speaking to more of person characteristics rather than the photograph characteristics, it 
still supports the hypotheses concerning these appraisals and disgust.   
The reliability estimates for this model diverge somewhat from that of the random 
coefficients model for disgust.  The reliability for the intercept decreased while the 
reliabilities for the slopes increased.  For average disgust, then, 59.7% of the variability 
can be attributed to true differences between people; 42.7% of the variability in the slope 
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for value incongruence and 28.4% of the variability in the slope for unpleasantness can 
be attributed to true differences between people.  For the variance-covariance matrix for 
this model, see Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5 
Variance-Covariance Matrix For Disgust: Intercepts and Slopes as Outcomes Model 
 
   Intercept  Pleasantness  Value Incongruence 
 
Intercept  0.1347   -0.0307  0.0425  
Pleasantness  -0.0307  0.0188   0.0112   
Value Incongruence 0.0425   0.0112   0.0507 
 
 
  
Rejection 
 The goal of Study 1 was to not only replicate previous findings concerning anger 
and disgust, but also to assess the association between these emotions and rejection, the 
hypothesized action tendency.  From the intraclass correlation for the ANOVA model of 
rejection, it is known that 23.09% of the variability in rejection can be attributed to 
variability between people, and so approximately 77% of the variance is at the between-
photograph, within-person level. While this is higher than that of the models for anger 
and disgust, the significance of the variance component was still assessed to support the 
use of multilevel modeling.  The variance was significant (τ 00=0.82, χ2(79)=410.79, 
p<0.001), and thus the nesting of the data within-person is appropriate.  The reliability of 
the intercept (γ00 = 3.86, SE = 0.11, t(79) = 34.31, p<0.001) was 0.808, and so we can be 
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confident that 80.8% of the variability in average rejection can be attributed to true 
differences between people.   
 When the random coefficients model for rejection was performed, the predictor 
variables at level 1 were again group-mean centered. Analyses revealed that people were 
more likely to reject statements supporting the photographs as anger increased (γ10 = -
0.17, SE = 0.04, t(79) = -3.99, p<0.001) and disgust increased (γ20 = -0.37, SE =0 .03, 
t(79) = -10.98, p<0.001).  Rejection, then, can be considered to be a relative emotion 
component of anger and disgust.  While the variance associated with average rejection 
(γ00 = 3.86, SE =0.11, t(79) = 34.31, p<0.001) was significant (τ 00=0.91, χ2(74)=653.96, 
p<0.001), the variance associated with anger (τ 11=0.03, χ2(74)=90.85, p=0.089) and 
disgust (τ 22=0.02, χ2(74)=91.33, p=0.084) was only marginally so.  Nonetheless, the 
deviance test indicated that the model was best when these variables were included as 
random effects (χ2(5)=35.12, p<0.001).  
 The within-person variance of the ANOVA and random coefficients models 
revealed that the inclusion of anger and disgust as predictors of rejection explained 
42.91% of the variance at level 1.  From the reliabilities of the random coefficients 
model, 89.0% of the variance of average rejection, 19.3% of the variance in the slope of 
anger, and 21.4% of the variance in the slope of disgust can be attributed to true 
differences between people.  For the variance-covariance matrix of this model, see Table 
6. 
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Table 6 
Variance-Covariance Matrix For Rejection: Random Coefficients Model 
 
   Intercept  Anger   Disgust 
 
Intercept  0.9130   0.0369   -0.0177  
Anger   0.0369   0.0299   -0.0022   
Disgust  -0.0177  -0.0022  0.0217 
  
 
     
 The results of the intercepts and slopes as outcomes model for rejection supported 
the findings of the random coefficients model for the level 1 effects.  People were again 
more likely to reject statements supporting the photographs when they reported higher 
levels of anger (γ10 = -0.17, SE=0.04, t(79)= -4.11, p<0.001) and disgust (γ20 = -0.37, SE 
= 0.03, t(79) = -10.913, p<0.001).  Also replicating the random coefficients model, the 
variance components for the predictor variables were marginally significant (anger: 
τ11=0.03, χ2(74)=90.77, p=0.090; disgust: τ 22=0.02, χ2(74)=91.23, p=0.085), while the 
variance for the intercept (γ00 = 5.41, SE =0.37, t(77) =14.473, p<0.001) was significant 
(τ 00=0.73, χ2(72)=547.22, p<0.001).  Again the deviance test supported the inclusion of 
the predictor variables as random effects (χ2(5)=35.79, p<0.001). 
 When the aggregate of anger was included at level 2, the effect was not 
significant (γ01 =0.17, SE =0.17, t(77) = 1.043, p=0.300).  What this suggests is that 
people did not approach the photographs angry and then reject them, but rather the 
content of the photographs elicited the angry responses that were associated with 
rejection.  In contrast, the effect for the aggregate of disgust was significant (γ02 = -0.77, 
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SE = 0.18, t(77) = -4.25, p<0.001), suggesting that people who were predisposed to view 
a stimulus object as disgusting were more likely to reject the statements supporting that 
object.  The reliabilities of this model suggest that average rejection is being modeled 
well, and that 86.7% of the variance in rejection can be attributed to true differences 
between people.  The reliabilities for the slopes of anger and disgust (0.200 and 0.213 
respectively) suggest that the variance for these variables is not being modeled well, 
which is logical given their marginally significant variance components.  For the 
variance-covariance matrix for this model, see Table 7.   
 
 
Table 7 
Variance-Covariance Matrix For Rejection: Intercepts and Slopes as Outcomes Model 
 
   Intercept  Anger   Disgust 
 
Intercept  0.7321   0.0425   -0.0340  
Anger   0.0425   0.0316   -0.0030   
Disgust  -0.0340  -0.0030  0.0215 
 
 
 
Predicting Anger from Disgust 
 Given that anger and disgust are often grouped together or used interchangeably, 
it is logical to assume that you may predict one emotion from the other.  For this reason, 
analyses predicting anger from disgust were conducted.  Since the ANOVA model for 
anger has already been discussed, it will not be addressed here.  From the random 
coefficients model, it was found that, as expected, disgust significantly predicted anger 
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(γ10 = 0.55, SE=0.03, t(79)= 17.92, p<0.001).  Thus, people were more likely to report 
anger when they reported more disgust.  The variance component for the intercept (γ00 = 
2.09, SE=0.08, t(79)= 24.65, p<0.001) was significant (τ 00=0.50, χ2(79)=560.03, 
p<0.001), as was that for disgust (τ 11=0.05, χ2(79)=293.04, p<0.001).  The covariance for 
the intercept and the predictor (disgust) was 0.1522. 
 Using the within-person variance from the ANOVA and random coefficients 
model, it was found that 62.19% of the variance in anger at the between-photograph level 
could be explained by inclusion of disgust as a predictor variable.  In addition, the 
reliabilities indicate that 85.9% of the variability in average anger and 66.4% of the 
variability in the slope for disgust can be attributed to true differences between people.   
Discussion 
 Overall the results of Study 1 are consistent with previous research: value 
incongruence and intentionality were appraisal components of anger, and value 
incongruence and unpleasantness were components of disgust.  Evidence was also found 
that indicated that people who were more likely to make an attribution of intention to 
begin with reported more anger.  In addition, it was found that those who are more likely 
to perceive something as incongruent with their values and unpleasant from the outset 
were more likely to report higher levels of disgust.  Thus, not only can associations 
between appraisals and emotions be assessed in respect to a given stimulus object, but 
also in terms of general person characteristics. 
 Anger and disgust also significantly predicted people’s rejection of statements 
supporting the photographs.  Furthermore, generalizations about person characteristics 
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can be made here in that people who were more likely to be disgusted in general were 
more likely to reject the statements.  Anger and disgust were also related in that disgust 
predicted anger, a finding not surprising given the similarities between these emotions.  
Although all of these results were expected and mirror the results of previous research, a 
self-report method of action tendency is still a weak indicator of behavior.  Study 2 thus 
extends beyond self-reports in an attempt to associate actual behavior with these 
emotions.  
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CHAPTER VI 
STUDY 2 
 
 
 The goal of Study 2 was to associate emotions with behavior rather than with just 
the potential for behavior.  Following a strategy often used in intrinsic motivation 
research (e.g., Sansone, Weir, Harpster, & Morgan, 1992), Study 2 measured rejection 
through the selection of a gift offered at the end of the study.  People completing the 
study were offered the chance to receive one of four postcards of the photographs used in 
the study, one of which was of a controversial target photograph.  It was hypothesized 
that the more anger and disgust a person reported to the target photograph, the more 
likely they were to reject the target postcard. 
Participants 
 A total of 78 undergraduate students (15 males, 61 females, 2 unreported) at the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro participated in this study.  Students received 
one credit towards a research option in their General Psychology course. 
Materials 
 Eight full-color photographs were selected for this study.  The pictures were again 
selected based on their potential to elicit a variety of responses.  Table 8 lists the 
photographs used in alphabetical order by title.   
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Table 8 
Study 2 Photographs by Alphabetical Order 
 
Photograph    Artist    Year 
 
Aeronaut 2    Maria Friberg   2002 
Aware But Still There 2  Maria Friberg   2002 
Chicago    Harry Callahan  c. 1950 
Dog On Wheels   Robert Doisneau  1977 
Element 2    Mary Woodall   2002 
Japanese Bath    Louise Dahl Wolfe  1954 
Piss Christ    Andres Serrano  1987 
Untitled (#314F)   Cindy Sherman  1994 
 
 
 
Procedure and Design  
 Students were introduced to the experiment in the same manner as Study 1 with 
one exception.  Students were told that at the end of the experiment they would be 
offered a small thank you gift for their participation.  At this point, they were not told 
what the gift would be.  They were told that this gift would have to be mailed to them 
since we could not buy them until it was known how many were needed.  While the 
students were asked for their mailing addresses, they were assured that their 
confidentiality would be maintained and that their personal information would be 
separated from their questionnaires.  After coding for which gift they selected, their 
information was indeed separated from their other materials.   
 Students were given booklets akin to the booklets in Study 1.  Each photograph in 
the booklet was labeled as before and was accompanied by its title and a brief 
description.  There were seven filler photographs and one target photograph, Piss Christ, 
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which was chosen for the strong emotions it has been shown to elicit (Silvia & Brown, in 
press).  There were a total of eight orders of presentation for the photographs so that the 
target photograph appeared as Picture 1 through Picture 8.  The order of the photographs 
around the target was randomly assigned and was different for each booklet.   
 Students then received a questionnaire with one page corresponding to each 
picture.  Students were asked to view each photograph and to rate how much they agreed 
with each of the thirteen statements.  Each statement assessed a different emotion (see 
Appendix B for sample questionnaire listing emotions).  All statements were measured 
on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “not at all” to 7 “yes, definitely.”  Personality 
scales and demographic measures were included at the end of the questionnaire for 
exploratory purposes.  Space was provided at the end of the questionnaire for students to 
share additional comments about the study.  When participants had completed the 
questionnaire, they were given a written debriefing that included contact information for 
the experimenter (in case further questions or comments arose) and sources for further 
information on the topic of the study. 
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CHAPTER VII 
RESULTS 
 
 
 Although Study 2 used self-report measures of emotions, rejection was measured 
through the selection/rejection of a target postcard, thus providing a behavioral measure 
not found in previous research of appraisal theories.  It was predicted that the more anger 
and disgust people reported, the more likely they were to reject the postcard depicting the 
controversial photograph.  To begin the analyses, parametric and nonparametric 
correlations were conducted for the ratings of anger and disgust for the target photograph 
(see Table 9).  As suggested by the results of Study 1, anger and disgust were strongly 
correlated.  Additionally, anger and disgust were both moderately correlated with 
postcard selection, providing the first indication that these negative emotions could 
predict rejection.  The significance of all correlations suggests that those who selected the 
Piss Christ photograph and those who did not significantly differed in terms of average 
anger and disgust.   
 
 
Table 9 
Pearson’s r and Kendall’s τb Correlations for Study 2 
 
   Postcard  Anger   Disgust 
Postcard   1   r = .363**  r = .350* 
Anger   τ = .293*  1   r = .817** 
Disgust  τ = .307*  τ = .709**  1  
*p < .05,  ** p < .01    
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Of the 78 people in the study, one-third did not choose any of the four postcards.  
This posed a problem: should those people who did not select a postcard be treated as 
missing and omitted from the analyses? Or should they be considered to have also 
rejected the Piss Christ postcard? Because there was no way to know which option would 
best represent those who opted not to select a postcard, analyses were performed in which 
those people were excluded (n=53), and with them included and coded as having rejected 
the Piss Christ postcard (n=76, two were missing for other reasons).  In both analyses, 
the results were comparable (see below).  Only 5 people selected the Piss Christ postcard, 
which is only 6.4% if all people are included and 9.4% of those who actually selected a 
postcard.   
Because the outcome variable for the study was binary (selecting versus rejecting 
Piss Christ), logistic regression analyses were conducted to test the probabilities of a 
person selecting the target postcard.  When anger was entered as the sole predictor, it 
significantly predicted postcard selection when those who did not select a postcard were 
included (b =0.65, SE =0.29, Wald(1) 4.96, p<0.03), and when they were included as 
having rejected Piss Christ (b =0.57, SE =0.28, Wald(1) 4.22, p<0.05).  Table 10 lists the 
probabilities of rejecting the Piss Christ postcard given a particular anger rating.  From 
this table it can be seen that the angrier people reported being, the less likely they were to 
select the Piss Christ postcard. Interestingly, the probability of rejecting the Piss Christ 
postcard was at chance level (i.e., p=0.50) at an anger rating value not represented by the 
7-point scale used in the study.  What this means is that for the probability of selecting 
versus rejecting Piss Christ to be 0.50, the anger rating reported by any given person 
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would have to be 0.0713 if n=53, or -1.3176 if n=76.  This indicates that while anger did 
influence the probability of rejection, people were likely to reject the postcard anyway.  
 
 
Table 10 
Probabilities of Rejecting Piss Christ Postcard Per Anger Rating 
 
    Probabilities 
__________________ 
Emotion  Rating   n = 53  n = 76 
 
Anger   -1.3176    .5000 
   .0713   .5000   
1   .6662  .7905 
   2   .7918  .8700 
   3   .8788  .9223 
   4   .9325  .9547 
   5   .9634  .9739 
   6   .9805  .9851 
   7   .9897  .9916 
Note.  Some people did not choose to receive any postcard.  One set of analyses was 
conducted excluding these people (n = 53).  A second set of analyses was conducted with 
the missing values coded as rejecting the Piss Christ postcard (n = 78). 
 
 
 
When disgust was entered as the sole predictor, it too significantly predicted 
postcard selection when missing cases were excluded (b =0.61, SE =0.276, Wald(1) = 
4.90, p <0.03), and when the missing cases were coded as rejecting Piss Christ (b =0.54, 
SE =0.26, Wald(1) 4.19, p<0.05).  Table 11 gives the probabilities associated with disgust 
and rejection of the Piss Christ postcard.  The same phenomenon that occurred with 
anger can be seen with disgust: while disgust significantly influenced probability levels, 
the disgust rating for which selection or rejection was at chance levels did not exist.  
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Again this indicates that people did not want to pick this postcard even when they 
reported not being disgusted at all. 
 
 
Table 11 
Probabilities of Rejecting Piss Christ Postcard Per Disgust Rating 
 
    Probabilities 
__________________ 
Emotion  Rating   n = 53  n = 76 
 
Disgust  -1.2766    .5000 
   -.0705   .5000   
1   .6381  .7717 
   2   .7644  .8523 
   3   .8566  .9079 
   4   .9166  .9439 
   5   .9529  .9664 
   6   .9738  .9800 
   7   .9856  .9882 
Note.  Some people did not choose to receive any postcard.  One set of analyses was 
conducted excluding these people (n = 53).  A second set of analyses was conducted with 
the missing values coded as rejecting the Piss Christ postcard (n = 78). 
 
 
 
 The results of these analyses fit the predictions in that greater levels of anger and 
disgust resulted in a greater probability of rejection, but neither anger nor disgust 
emerged as a significant predictor when both were included as predictor variables.  As 
suggested by the correlations, these two variables may be too strongly related for them to 
constitute independent effects.  To test this idea, an aggregate variable was created – 
hostile – by averaging anger and disgust.  This variable was then submitted to the logistic 
regression analysis, and was found to be a significant predictor of postcard selection 
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(b=0.703, SE =0.303, Wald(1) = 5.40, p<0.03).  The probabilities associated with varying 
rates of hostility can be seen in Table 12.  As hostility increased, so too did the 
probability of rejection.  Again here it was found that the hostility rating at which 
rejection would be at chance levels does not exist, and thus the conclusion stands that 
while hostility influenced rejection, people were likely to reject the postcard even when 
reporting no hostility.  
 
 
Table 12 
Probabilities of Rejecting Piss Christ Postcard Per Hostile Rating 
 
    Probabilities 
__________________ 
Emotion  Rating   n = 53  n = 76 
 
Hostile   -.6475     .5000 
   -.3912   .5000   
   1   .6054  .7429 
   2   .7560  .8462 
   3   .8622  .9129 
   4   .9267  .9523 
   5   .9623  .9743 
   6   .9810  .9864 
   7   .9905  .9928 
Note.  Some people did not choose to receive any postcard.  One set of analyses was 
conducted excluding these people (n = 53).  A second set of analyses was conducted with 
the missing values coded as rejecting the Piss Christ postcard (n = 78). 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 From Study 2 we learn that rejection is not just an action tendency that 
corresponds to anger and disgust, but it is an actual behavior as well.  People who 
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reported more anger and disgust were more likely to reject the postcard depicting Piss 
Christ.  Interestingly, the significant overlap between anger and disgust supports 
precisely what previous research has indicated concerning their relationship.  These two 
emotions share considerable appraisal components, and the distinction between the two 
can be difficult to detect. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
 Emotions are complex constructs that are an integral aspect of human life.  If this 
were not so, people would not watch movies that make them cry, or paint beautiful 
landscapes, or even hug their children.  Everyday we are inundated with an array of 
emotions unparalled by any other species, and it seems intuitive that these emotions 
somehow govern our behaviors.  There are countless ways in which we come to think, 
feel, and act in particular ways, and appraisal theories can aid us in understanding the 
thoughts behind the emotions and the behaviors that could result. 
 Appraisal theorists have consistently been successful in associating particular 
thoughts with subsequent emotions.  Assessments of value incongruence and 
intentionality are related to one’s anger; similarly, assessments of value incongruence and 
unpleasantness can predict disgust.  Study 1 provides further support for these 
relationships through the use of aesthetic stimuli.  While the results of this study would 
come as no surprise to appraisal theorists, one merit to be found lies in the fact that 
thoughts and emotions here were assessed at the moment when people were confronted 
with the stimuli.  Much of the previous research on emotions has assessed retrospective 
events (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Kuppens et al., 2003), and one’s evaluation of an event 
can change over time.  Thus, Study 1 contributes to the validity of the findings of 
previous research on appraisal theories. 
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Study 1 also contributes to appraisal theories by using additional items to measure 
appraisals, and by establishing an action tendency associated with anger and disgust.  
Modeled after the study by Silvia and Brown (in press) in which only one item was used 
to measure each appraisal, Study 1 used two scale items to measure value incongruence 
and intentionality.  These items were aggregated to create a single score for each 
appraisal, each of which were significant and thus further support the association between 
appraisals and emotions.  Furthermore, by using phrases that endorse various forms of 
support for the artworks presented, rejection of these statements was predicted by 
increases in ratings of anger and disgust.  This association supports the contention that 
rejection is a relevant action tendency for anger and disgust.   
While some might argue that rejection as the statements in Study 1 define it is not 
an actual behavioral component, appraisal theories suggest that it is.  Often we may want 
to act in a particular way that is constrained by our conscious, societal standards, and 
even logic.  Action tendencies reflect action readiness, or the desire or willingness to 
engage in a given behavior, and no behavior has to actually occur for the association 
between an emotion and action tendency to be established.  Study 1 thus signifies that the 
use of self-report measures in appraisal research is not only acceptable but also desirable. 
Nonetheless, Study 2 was conducted to bolster this association between negative 
emotions and rejection. 
  Study 2 illustrated that the more anger and disgust people experienced in 
response to a target object (Piss Christ photograph), the more likely they were to reject 
that object (Piss Christ postcard).  Moreover, when anger and disgust were combined to 
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reflect an overall hostile reaction, people were again more likely to reject Piss Christ as 
ratings for the variable increased.  What this indicates is that rejection reflects a behavior 
associated with not only these negative emotions, but perhaps others as well.  It is 
particularly likely that rejection is associated with contempt, the other emotion 
comprising the hostility triad.   Study 2 also contributes to appraisal and aesthetic theories 
by suggesting a new manner by which to study action tendencies.  While the selection or 
rejection of a gift has been used extensively in motivational research, it has yet to be used 
to study these theories.  However, any emotion or stimulus object thought to be 
associated with an approach or avoidance behavior can be studied using this behavioral 
measure. 
The information provided by Study 1 and 2 also brings us a step closer to 
understanding the behavior such as that surrounding the Culture War of the 1990s.  Not 
all negative responses in art result in vandalism, censorship, and congressional hearings.  
So what about the artworks caused them to be so strongly opposed?  The research 
presented here would suggest that people were so angered and disgusted by the works 
that they acted out in a variety of ways to demonstrate their rejection of the artworks and 
the artists themselves.  It is beyond the scope of this research project to make this 
statement for certain, but when reading the proceedings of the congressional hearing 
concerning this particular culture war (Van Camp, 1997), it is easy to pick out the 
statements that reflect appraisals such as value incongruence. In addition, to fail to notice 
the underlying angry tones with which many make their statements is near impossible. 
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The research presented here, along with appraisal theories in general, hold some 
interesting implications for various other fields.  For example, in clinical psychology, 
cognitive-behavioral treatments have long focused on changing problematic thoughts and 
behaviors in order help patients overcome mood and other disorders. Since appraisal 
theories focus on identifying relevant components of emotions, they could aid in making 
these treatments more effective.  If an emotion is playing a deterministic role in a 
disorder, clinicians might be able to identify the dysfunctional thoughts and behaviors 
associated with that disorder without having to rely primarily on what a patient is telling 
them.  A similar approach could be taken in the legal field when a person commits a 
seemingly "senseless" crime.  By knowing what emotions might have played a role in 
that crime, legal professionals could break down the thought processes (appraisals) that 
led to that crime and bolster a weak prosecution or defense.  While these examples are 
not exhaustive, the point to be taken is that in any situation where an emotion is thought 
to be associated with behavior, appraisal theories can aid in the understanding of how 
those constructs are related. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 While the research presented here indicates that action tendencies are legitimate 
components of appraisal structures of emotions, and that rejection is a tendency 
associated with negative emotions, more research is needed to determine the extent to and 
ways in which rejection is a behavior manifestation of negative emotions.  Obviously the 
selection or rejection of a postcard can offer only so much insight into behavior, and thus 
the applicability of the research present here is limited.  There are no direct consequences 
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of this behavior, whereas there are often dramatic consequences to our behavior in 
everyday life.  Future research should establish a model to test appraisal theories in a 
context where one’s behavior might actually have an impact (or at least have those 
involved think that their behavior would have an impact).  Such a model could potentially 
solidify the significant ability of appraisal theories in explaining emotions and behaviors. 
 Another limitation of the studies presented here is the substantial overlap between 
anger and disgust that has not been demonstrated in previous appraisal research.  While 
the two commonly co-occur and share the appraisal of value incongruence, it is likely 
here that they are being used interchangeably.  In Study 1, disgust predicted anger almost 
as well as the appraisal model; their shared variance in Study 2 made it necessary to 
create an aggregate variable in order for them both to be considered within the same 
model.  It may be that the reason for this overlap is due to the highly provocative nature 
of the stimuli used.  For instance, Piss Christ could be deemed disgusting because of the 
use of urine (unpleasant), while also making people angry through the use of a powerful 
religious symbol (value incongruent).  As another example, people could find Fatal 
Meningitis disgusting because it is a picture of a deceased infant (unpleasant), while also 
being angered that the artist violated the privacy of one's family by taking the picture 
(value incongruent or intentionality).   
It could also be that these two emotions really are synonymous, as Nabi (2002) 
suggested with the finding that definitions of disgust had evolved to reflect anger rather 
repulsion.  Or it could be that the domain of disgust used is important.  In this research, 
the relevant domain would be the socio-moral domain.  However, using a domain such as 
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core or animal-reminder disgust might result in findings that more clearly differentiate 
between the two emotions.  In the future, an attempt should be make to distinguish anger 
and disgust from one another to determine if they are as similar as indicated by the 
present research.  If they are still found to be similar, then they should be expected to 
share more appraisal components.  If they are found to still have distinct components, 
other research should take this into account when considering the effects of certain 
stimulus materials. 
Further blurring the lines between anger and disgust is that both significantly 
predicted rejection in both Study 1 and Study 2.  This is problematic if the findings of 
Frijda and colleagues (1989) are taken into consideration.  These researchers found 
initially that anger and disgust did not diverge in action tendency factors.  However, 
when more concise research was conducted, anger was associated with moving against 
action tendencies, whereas disgust was associated with moving away action tendencies.  
It is not clear which of these action tendencies would be represented by rejection as it is 
defined in this research.  While not endorsing statements supporting the artworks could 
be seen as an action tendency meant to keep the controversial artworks away from 
oneself, it could also reflect a behavior aimed at acting out against the artwork.  This 
ambiguity suggests another means by which emotions may need to be distinguished from 
one another: the goal of the behavior. 
Empirically the focus has been on cognitive appraisals of emotion, with some 
attention to action tendencies.  However, there is another aspect that Roseman, Wiest, 
and Swartz (1994) have found to differentiate emotions and that is the goals of the 
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behavior associated with the emotions.  For instance, a person who is angry might act out 
in way that is meant to do harm to another person, or they might go running in the hopes 
that physical stress with act as a form of catharsis for mental stress.  Obviously there are 
countless reasons why a person might engage in a particular behavior, and categorization 
of behaviors based on emotions would be impractical due to likely overlap.  Nonetheless, 
when trying to parse out emotions and their behavioral counterparts in particular 
contexts, assessing potential goals could be beneficial in accurately defining components 
of appraisal and emotion models.   
A caveat of appraisal theories in general that is worthy of admission here is that, 
even though there is clear evidence supporting componential, structural models of 
emotions, insight as to how these components interact is lacking.  Research into process 
models in appraisal theories is just beginning, and many questions about emotions are 
unanswered at this point.  Currently, appraisal theorists are considering the possibility of 
a dual-process model in which each process has its own distinct cognitive mechanisms 
(Smith, 2006).  One theorized process is an associative process that is automatic, fast, and 
associated with a low level of cognition.  The second process is reasoning, the slow, 
controlled, linear-serial cognitive process.  In addition, theorists are concerned with how 
previous appraisals and emotions in turn affect future appraisals and emotions, and how 
an emotion might revert to change the initial appraisals that were thought to bring it 
about.   Without a doubt, the direction that appraisal research is heading into promises to 
enable us to understand even more about our emotions and their role in our lives.
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Appendix A 
Sample Questionnaire – Study 1 
This picture makes me angry. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
This picture is disgusting. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
I find this picture interesting. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
This picture is pleasant. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
The artist is deliberately trying to upset people. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
This picture violates society’s standards.   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
This picture goes against my values. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
The artist is intentionally trying to offend people like me. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
Should this picture be shown at UNCG’s Weatherspoon Art Museum? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
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Should the government provide grants to financially support this kind of art? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
Should this kind of art be displayed in public museums? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
   no, definitely not                                                yes, definitely 
 
How artistic is this picture? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
    not artistic at all                                               very artistic 
 
In your opinion, is this “art”? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
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Appendix B 
 
Sample Questionnaire – Study 2 
 
This picture makes me angry. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
This picture makes me happy. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
I find this picture interesting. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely   
 
This picture disgusts me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
This picture makes me sad. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
This picture is fascinating.   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
This picture makes me nervous. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
I find this picture boring. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
This picture makes me feel ashamed. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
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This picture makes me feel proud. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
This picture is gross. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      not at all                                                          yes, definitely 
 
How artistic is this picture? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
     not artistic at all                                               very artistic 
 
In your opinion, is this “art”? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
     not at all                                                           yes, definitely  
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Appendix C 
Definition of a Random Effects ANOVA Model 
Level 1 Model:  Yij = β0j + rij 
Level 2 Model:  β0j = γ00 + u0j 
 
In the present research, i corresponds to photograph and j corresponds to person. 
 
β0j:  an intercept that describes the mean of the outcome variable for person j (or other 
level 2 unit of analysis); also is a function of the grand mean of the outcome variable (γ00) 
plus an error term (u0j) describing how person j deviates from this grand mean.  In the 
present research, the intercepts describe the average anger, disgust, and rejection ratings 
for person j. 
 
rij:  random error term; also describes how person j's score for a particular level 1 unit of 
analysis (in this case, photograph i) differs from that person's mean for the outcome 
variable. 
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Appendix D 
Definition of a Random Coefficients Model 
Level 1 Model: Yij = β 0j + β 1j (X1ij - X1·j) + β 2j (X2ij - X2·j)+ rij 
Level 2 Models: β0j = γ00 + u0j 
   β1j = γ10 + u1j 
   β2j = γ20 + u2j 
 
Allow i to represent photograph and j to represent person.  Define X1 as value 
incongruence for the model predicting anger and disgust, and as anger for the model 
predicting rejection.  Define X2 as intentionality for the anger model, unpleasantness for 
the disgust model, and as disgust for the rejection model. 
 
β0j: an intercept depicting the mean score of Y (Y = anger/disgust/rejection) for person j 
when X1ij and X2ij are at their mean; also is a function of the grand mean of Y (γ00) plus 
an error term (u0j) describing how person j deviates from this grand mean.   
 
β1j: the average regression slope describing the rate of change in Y for every one-unit 
change in the first group mean centered level 1 predictor (X1ij - X1·j); also is a function of 
the grand mean of all slopes (γ10) plus an error term (u1j) describing how person j deviates 
from this grand mean.   
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β2j: the average regression slope describing the rate of change in Y for every one-unit 
change in the second group mean centered level 1 predictor (X2ij - X2·j); also is a function 
of the grand mean of all slopes (γ20) plus an error term (u2j) describing how person j 
deviates from this grand mean.  
 
rij: random error associated with level 1 variables; in the present research, this term 
describes the error associated with photograph i for person j.  
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Appendix E 
Definition of an Intercepts and Slopes as Outcomes Model 
Level 1 Model:  Yij = β 0j + β 1j (X1ij - X1·j) + β 2j (X2ij - X2·j) + rij 
Level 2 Models:  β0j = γ00 + γ01W1.j + γ02 W2.j + u0j 
      β1j = γ10 + u1j 
     β2j = γ20 + u2j 
Allow i to represent photograph and j to represent person.  Define X1 as value 
incongruence for the model predicting anger and disgust, and as anger for the model 
predicting rejection.  Define X2 as intentionality for the anger model, unpleasantness for 
the disgust model, and as disgust for the rejection model. 
 
β0j: an intercept depicting the mean score of Y (Y = anger/disgust/rejection) for person j 
when X1ij and X2ij are at their mean; also is a function of the grand mean of Y (γ00) and 
two slopes (γ01 and γ02) describing the rate of change in the grand mean for every one-
unit change in W1.j  and W2.j, plus an error term (u0j) describing how person j deviates 
from this grand mean.   
 
 W1.j: the aggregate (mean) of X1 for person j.  
 W2.j: the aggregate (mean) of X2 for person j. 
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β1j: the average regression slope describing the rate of change in Y for every one-unit 
change in the first group mean centered level 1 predictor (X1ij - X1·j); also is a function of 
the grand mean of all slopes (γ10) plus an error term (u1j) describing how person j deviates 
from this grand mean.   
 
β2j: the average regression slope describing the rate of change in Y for every one-unit 
change in the second group mean centered level 1 predictor (X2ij - X2·j); also is a function 
of the grand mean of all slopes (γ20) plus an error term (u2j) describing how person j 
deviates from this grand mean.  
 
rij: random error associated with level 1 variables; in the present research, this term 
describes the error associated with photograph i for person j.  
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